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Abstract
The Supreme Court’s decision in Salman v. United States reaffirmed (and indeed, clarified)
the central holding of Dirks v. SEC that no additional pecuniary or reputational gain is needed
when an insider gives information to a “trading relative or friend.” While this was considered a
win for prosecutors, the Court chose to abstain from considering more complex questions regard-
ing tipper-tippee liability. Namely, the Court provided no guidance on what constitutes a “friend”
or “trading relative” nor how a tippee “should know” whether information was improperly dis-
closed. Without any clear standards, prosecutors and courts have wide discretion to determine
whether these criteria are met, which is often a case-specific and fact-intensive inquiry. Antici-
pating some of these difficulties, this Note proposes some objective criteria for courts to consider
when determining whether the criteria in Salman has been satisfied. This promotes a uniform state
of tipper-tippee liability and avoids uncertainty about the outcomes in future insider trading cases.
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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s decision in Salman v. United States reaffirmed
(and indeed, clarified) the central holding of Dirks v. SEC that no
additional pecuniary or reputational gain is needed when an insider
gives information to a “trading relative or friend.” While this was
considered a win for prosecutors, the Court chose to abstain from
considering more complex questions regarding tipper-tippee liability.
Namely, the Court provided no guidance on what constitutes a
“friend” or “trading relative” nor how a tippee “should know”
whether information was improperly disclosed. Without any clear
standards, prosecutors and courts have wide discretion to determine
whether these criteria are met, which is often a case-specific and fact-
intensive inquiry. Anticipating some of these difficulties, this Note
proposes some objective criteria for courts to consider when
determining whether the criteria in Salman has been satisfied. This
promotes a uniform state of tipper-tippee liability and avoids
uncertainty about the outcomes in future insider trading cases.
TABLE OFCONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 598
I. THEDEVELOPMENTOF INSIDER TRADINGLAW .... 599
A. HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OFRULE 10B-5 ............... 599
B. THEHISTORY OF TIPPER-TIPPEE LIABILITY ...................... 602
1. Dirks and the Criteria for Tippee Liability ................ 602
 J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2018; LLM Candidate,
Universidad Pontificia Comillas, 2018; B.A., University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, 2011.
I would like to thank my friends and family for their unwavering support during my three
years at law school. I would like to give special thanks to Professor Caroline Gentile for
her advice in writing this article, her mentorship, and most importantly, her staunch
support of the Michigan Wolverines.
598 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW
2. Subsequent Interpretations of Dirks .......................... 604
II. THE STATUSOFTIPPER-TIPPEE LIABILITYUNDER
THECLASSICALTHEORYPOST-SALMAN............... 607
A. QUESTIONSREMAININGAFTER SALMAN............................ 607
1. What Constitutes “Knowledge” of
the Initial Breach? ................................................... 607
2. Classification and Criteria of Relationships
Permitting an Inference of a Personal Benefit ........ 608
B. THE LIMITS OF SALMAN ..................................................... 610
III. THENEED FORMORECOMPLETEDEFINITIONS
OF “KNOWLEDGE”AND “PERSONALBENEFIT” .. 613
A. IMMEDIATE FAMILYMEMBERS ......................................... 614
B. ROOMMATES..................................................................... 615
C. PEOPLE WITHWHOM THE TIPPER HASMEANINGFUL
CONTACT ........................................................................ 615
D. PARTIESWHOKNOW OR SHOULDKNOWMATERIAL,
NONPUBLIC INFORMATION ISBEINGDISCUSSED ............. 616
E. PARTIESWHERE THE TIPPERHAS EXPLICITLY
DISCLOSED THENONPUBLIC INFORMATION FOR A
NON-PERSONALBENEFIT ................................................ 618
CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 620
INTRODUCTION
An investor begins a new job at an investment company, where he is
very eager to succeed. Confused with some of the more technical aspects
of his new position, he asks his sister, a chemist, for advice on
understanding the industry. During their conversation, the investor
unintentionally reveals information about a pending merger.
Unbeknownst to the investor, his sister passes this information to a friend,
and both trade on this information. Should the investor be liable for
insider trading when he did not know his sister was trading? What about
the friend who trades and did not know that the information was
confidential? What if the friend had a suspicion about the source of the
information, but this suspicion was unconfirmed?1
The answer to this hypothetical hinges on the question of whether a
court finds that the trader lacked the requisite knowledge to be held liable.
The Supreme Court’s recent case, Salman v. United States, was
1. These facts are similar to those of Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
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considered a win for prosecutors, but the decision provides little clarity
for those on the fringes of this intricate doctrine. The outcome in the
scenario described above may turn on a fact as simple as whether or not
the investor’s sister and her friend were merely “family friends,” and
further, how a lower court interprets this phrase.2 As with many Supreme
Court decisions, commentators and practitioners are able to discern
inconsistencies within precedent and anticipate many of the questions that
the Court’s rulings leave unanswered. This Note accordingly anticipates
some of these issues and offers solutions consistent with the Supreme
Court’s rationale for assigning insider trading liability.
Part I of this Note discusses the history giving rise to congressional
action to curb fraudulent securities trading. Part I also describes one of
the prominent doctrines of insider trading liability, namely the classical
theory. Part II analyzes the most recent Supreme Court case on insider
trading and highlights some of the uncertainties courts face in determining
liability. Part II describes these problems, including the difficulty of
defining what constitutes a friend or family member for the purpose of
determining liability, and what constitutes sufficient “knowledge” of an
improper disclosure of confidential information. Part III proposes new
criteria for courts to consider when assigning liability. These criteria aim
to clarify some of the confusion that prior insider trading cases have
created and promote uniformity in enforcing standards of liability in the
lower courts.
I. THEDEVELOPMENTOF INSIDERTRADINGLAW
A. HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OFRULE 10B-5
Before the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
Exchange Act), 3 securities exchanges were largely treated as private
clubs. Courts deferred to the exchanges to determine their own rules
governing membership criteria, discipline, and management. 4 As
2. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014).
3. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012)).
4. At this time, the courts generally deferred to the by-laws and internal regulations
for discipline for its members. See, e.g., Belton v. Hatch, 17 N.E. 225, 225–26 (N.Y.
1888) (“Their decision involves the legal relations to each other of the members
composing the association of the New York Stock Exchange, and the extent and validity
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securities trading became more significant to the American financial
system, Congress intervened to curb fraudulent behavior in the
exchanges.5 Despite the enactment of what was then Section 16(b) of the
Exchange Act, laws against insider trading were largely ineffective in
capturing the sort of insider trading that occurs today.6 As a result, courts
looked to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.7
Section 10(b) states that a party is guilty of insider trading when it
“use[s] or employ[s], in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of” the rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).8 Using the authority delegated by Section 10(b), the
SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5, which makes it illegal for a party “[t]o
engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.”9 Judicial interpretations of Rule 10b-5
have endorsed the “classical” theory of insider trading: namely that,
corporate insiders violate Rule 10b-5 when they purchase or sell securities
on the basis of material, nonpublic information.
The Second Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.10
provides the groundwork for the classical theory. In Texas Gulf Sulphur,
the defendants’ company began drilling in an area with promising
amounts of copper and zinc. 11 Several high-level managers and
researchers purchased stock and options in the company before revealing
their discovery to the trading public. 12 Once news of the mineral
of the powers reserved by its constitution and by-laws, and conferred upon its officers
and committees, in the management of its affairs, and in the control over a member.”).
5. Although these exchanges were, to a degree, self-regulated, the Supreme Court
held that they are also subject to other types of federal regulations aside from the
Exchange Act. See Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 351–57 (1963).
6. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties Into the
Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1204–05, 1223,
1229 (1995) (noting the limits of Section 16(b); namely, that it does not reach transactions
occurring more than six months apart, persons other than those named in the statute, and
transactions in securities not registered under Section 12).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
8. Id.
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (2017).
10. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
11. Id. at 843.
12. Id. at 844.
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discovery became public, the company’s stock price increased from
approximately $17.50 per share to $58.25 per share, resulting in large
profits for the inside researchers and managers.13
The insiders were found to have violated Rule 10b-5 by trading on
material, nonpublic information. 14 The court interpreted Rule 10b-5’s
language on deception and manipulation to mean that Congress intended
to prevent fraud and protect investors. Thus, the court concluded that all
investors should have “equal access” to material information to be subject
to identical market risks.15 Furthermore, the court held that, under Rule
10b-5, anyone who possesses privileged nonpublic information must
either disclose the information to the trading public or refrain from trading
based on that information.16
In Chiarella v. United States,17 the Supreme Court disavowed the
“equal access” rationale and narrowed the application of the classical
theory. The defendant in Chiarella was an employee at a financial
printing company who regularly handled documents concerning large,
nonpublic transactions. 18 Although the names of the parties to the
transactions were redacted or blank, the defendant deduced the
companies’ identities, purchased their stock, and then sold the stock at a
premium once the pending takeover news was publically announced.19
The Court held that convictions under Rule 10b-5 must be based
upon fraud, and “there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.” 20
Corporate fiduciaries, or individuals “in whom the sellers had placed their
trust and confidence,” have a duty to disclose before trading.21 Finding
that the defendant only interacted with the sellers through impersonal
market transactions and had no fiduciary relationship to the corporation,
13. Id. at 847.
14. Id. at 864.
15. Id. at 851–52.
16. Id. at 848.
17. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
18. Id. at 224.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 235. The duty to speak has its roots in the common law tort of deceit.
Accordingly, the Court notes that “not every instance of financial unfairness constitutes
fraudulent activity.” Id. at 232; see also Robert B. Thompson, Insider Trading, Investor
Harm, and Executive Compensation, 50 CASEW. RES. L. REV. 291, 294 (1999).
21. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232.
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the Court overturned his conviction.22 Thus, the classical theory’s duty to
disclose information or abstain from trading was limited to corporate
fiduciaries.
B. THEHISTORY OF TIPPER-TIPPEE LIABILITY
1. Dirks and the Criteria for Tippee Liability
Insiders, however, are not the only parties that may be held liable for
trading on material, nonpublic information under Rule 10b-5. In Dirks v.
SEC,23 the Supreme Court addressed chains of corporate insiders who
provide material, nonpublic information (tippers) to corporate outsiders
(tippees). Dirks was an officer of a broker-dealer firm. He received
information from a former officer of a corporation who revealed that the
corporation had vastly overstated its assets and urged Dirks to investigate
and expose this fraud.24 Dirks verified the claim of fraud by speaking with
insiders and asked a reporter to publish a story on the fraud; the reporter
refused. In the meantime, Dirks discussed his findings with his clients,
many of whom sold their holdings to avoid incurring a loss.25 The SEC
charged Dirks with violating Rule 10b-5, in part relying on dicta in
Chiarella, stating that tippees assume a duty to disclose or abstain from
trading when they know or should know information came from a
corporate insider.26
The Court, however, reversed Dirks’ conviction by analyzing the
chain through which tippees assume liability. A tippee acquires the
tipper’s fiduciary duty to the corporation upon receiving the nonpublic
information; therefore, a tippee is liable only if the tipper owes a fiduciary
duty to the corporation and the tippee “knows or should know that there
has been a breach” of this duty.27 Furthermore, for a breach of fiduciary
duty to exist, the tipper must derive a personal benefit from the
disclosure.28 This personal benefit is equated with implicitly promising to
use nonpublic information for only corporate purposes, but then instead
22. Id. at 232–33, 236–37.
23. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
24. Id. at 649.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 651.
27. Id. at 660.
28. Id. at 663.
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using this information to benefit personally, which deprives the
shareholders of the same gains.29
Courts may also infer a personal benefit when an insider gives a gift
of material, nonpublic information to a “trading relative or friend”; it is
as if the tipper used the nonpublic information to trade for a profit and
subsequently gifted the proceeds to the recipient. 30 This gift of
information is presumed to result in some personal benefit to the tipper—
whether the benefit is the satisfaction of helping someone the tipper
knows or the knowledge that the tipper’s reputation has been enhanced in
the eyes of the tippee.31
Applying this logic, the Dirks Court found that the tipper had not
disclosed material, nonpublic information for a benefit; rather, the tipper
only wanted to expose his employer’s fraud.32 In the absence of a personal
benefit to the initial tipper, there cannot be an initial breach. Without an
initial breach, there cannot be a derivative breach by the tippee, and
therefore, no liability attaches under Rule 10b-5.
The personal benefit test is appealing because it provides courts with
some objective criteria to determine whether there has been a breach by
the tipper.33 Dirks illustrates, however, that not all disclosures of material,
nonpublic information are illegal; the Court noted that there must be
“manipulation or deception” by the tipper, which directs lower courts to
consider the purpose of the disclosure.34 As shown by the facts in Dirks,
the Court presumably did not want to discourage insiders and reporters
29. See id. at 654.
30. Id. at 664.
31. See Jill E. Fisch, Family Ties: Salman and the Scope of Insider
Trading, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 46, 51 (2016) (describing the rationale as to why a
benefit is inferred with family and friends).
32. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.
33. “[T]he SEC and the courts are not required to read the parties’ minds. . . . [The
courts must] focus on objective criteria.” Id. at 663. The personal benefit test was
introduced into Justice Powell’s majority opinion to balance the subjective criteria of the
purpose of the disclosure with more objective factors; namely, whether the disclosure
would result in a pecuniary gain. See A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and
the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 941–42 (2003).
34. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473
(1977)).
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from investigating and exposing corporate fraud.35 However, requiring an
initial breach may be problematic when tippees do not use the nonpublic
information in the same way or for the same reason the disclosure was
made in the first place.36
Without any additional guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower
courts were left to their own devices to determine whether certain
disclosures and relationships fit within the Dirks framework.37
2. Subsequent Interpretations of Dirks
The language inDirks led two circuit courts to different applications
of the personal benefit test in tipper-tippee liability. In United States v.
Newman,38 two hedge fund portfolio managers, Newman and Chiasson,
were convicted in the district court for violating Rule 10b-5. In this case,
several financial analysts obtained the earnings of two corporations from
corporate insiders before the information was publicly announced.39 The
analysts relayed this information to their respective managers, who
subsequently traded on this information and made large profits. 40
Newman was three levels removed from the original tipper and Chiasson
was four levels removed.41
The defendants argued that the government failed to establish tippee
liability under Dirks. They argued there was no evidence that the initial
tippers received any benefit from their disclosure, which precluded the
existence of tippee liability further down the line.42 The defendants also
argued that even if the initial tippers received a benefit from their
disclosures, the defendants did not know about the benefit.43 The court
agreed that the evidence was insufficient to infer that the defendants knew
35. “Not ‘all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction,’
however, come within the ambit of Rule 10b-5.” Id. at 654 (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. at 472).
36. See infra Part III.
37. See infra Part II.
38. 773 F.3d 438 (2014).
39. Id. at 443.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 444.
43. Id.
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of any benefit provided by the insiders’ initial disclosures and vacated the
convictions.44
More notable, however, is the court’s finding that the insider-tippers’
disclosures did not result in a personal benefit. The court found that the
first-insider tipper and tippee were not “friends” even though they
attended school together, the tippee edited the tipper’s résumé, and gave
the tipper career advice and industry contacts.45 The court held that these
favors were not specific enough to find a friendship between the tipper
and tippee because the tippee regularly performed similar favors for
industry colleagues and fellow college alumni.46
The second insider-tipper and tippee attended the same church,
occasionally socialized, and were “family friends.” 47 The court still
viewed this relationship insufficient to infer a friendship.48 Since the
initial tippers were not friends with the tippees, no personal benefits
derived from the initial disclosures.49 Without an initial breach, there
could be no derivative breach down the chain of information.50 To infer a
personal benefit, the court held that parties must have a “meaningfully
close personal relationship” and engage in an exchange that presents “a
potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”51
In Salman v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the
subsequent question of whether a tipper must additionally benefit when
tipping to a friend or family member.52 The case involved two brothers,
one of whom was a corporate insider (Maher) and the other was a
corporate outsider (Michael). 53 Maher sought investment advice from
Michael because he had studied chemistry in college and could help
44. Id. at 451–52.
45. Id. at 452.
46. Id. at 453. These actions were not enough to be considered a friend under the
personal benefit test. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
47. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.
48. Id. at 452, 455.
49. Id. at 455.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 452. Requiring an additional benefit when Dirks stated that there is
“exploitation of nonpublic information . . . when an insider makes a gift of confidential
information to a trading relative or friend” presumably led the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.
52. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
53. Id. at 424.
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Maher understand some of the scientific aspects of his job. 54 These
conversations eventually lead Maher to disclose pending mergers to
Michael, which information Michael used to trade.55 Although initially
unaware of Michael’s trading, Maher eventually became aware of
Michael’s unlawful trading and continued to knowingly provide him with
information.56
Michael began sharing the information from Maher with his friend,
Salman, who also traded on these tips for a large profit.57 Salman was
convicted of violating Rule 10b-5.58 Salman appealed, arguing that Maher
never received any personal benefit by disclosing the nonpublic
information to Michael, and therefore no Rule 10b-5 liability could attach
to Salman.59
The Court disagreed with Salman’s argument and affirmed his
conviction.60 The Court overruled the requirement in Newman that tips to
trading relatives or friends must result in a pecuniary or reputational gain
to the tipper.61 Citing Dirks, the Court reiterated that tippers benefit from
gifts of nonpublic information to trading relatives or friends because gifts
of nonpublic information are equivalent to gifts of cash, which Dirks
explicitly prohibited. 62 The Court reasoned that Maher impliedly
benefited from his tips to Michael under Dirks. Salman acquired Maher’s
duty of trust and confidence from Michael, and breached it by trading on
information he knew was improperly disclosed.63
Salman effectively returned the status of tipper-tippee liability to a
pre-Newman state, where there is no burden to prove that a tipper’s
disclosure to a trading relative or friend must result in additional financial
gain.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 424–25.
58. Id. at 425.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 428–29.
61. Id. at 428.
62. Id. at 427–28.
63. Id. at 428.
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II. THE STATUSOFTIPPER-TIPPEELIABILITYUNDER
THECLASSICALTHEORYPOST-SALMAN
A. QUESTIONSREMAININGAFTER SALMAN
While Salman reaffirms the prohibition against trading based on
material, nonpublic information provided to a friend or family member as
a gift, some commentators called the Salman decision a “rubber-stamping
of the 33-year-old Dirks precedent,” indicating that Salman was a
“[h]ollow win” for federal prosecutors.64 Based on the narrow holding in
Salman, prosecutors are indeed left with several unanswered questions
and uncertain standards regarding the current state of tipper-tippee
liability under the classical theory of Rule 10b-5.
1. What Constitutes “Knowledge” of the Initial Breach?
First, Salman does not address what level or sort of knowledge the
tippee must have of the initial breach to assume fiduciary duty to a
corporation. In Newman, the court cited Dirks and circuit precedent to
hold that when there is an exchange of material, nonpublic information,
the tippee must “know[] of the personal benefit received by the insider.”65
The Court in Salman did not specify what constitutes “knowledge” of the
initial tipper’s breach to assume the insider’s fiduciary duties. Rather, the
Court noted that Newman required knowledge, but declined to give any
additional guidance as to what level or type of knowledge a tippee must
have regarding the personal benefit the initial tipper derives from
disclosing.66
There is further confusion regarding the standard of knowledge when
examining the proposition for which the Court in Salman citesDirks. The
tippee assumes the duty not to trade on material, nonpublic information if
64. See, e.g., Michael D. Guttentag, Salman Insider-Trading Case a Hollow Win for
Prosecutors, COLUM. L. SCH.: BLUE SKY BLOG (Dec. 14, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.
columbia.edu/2016/12/14/salman-insider-trading-case-a-hollow-win-for-prosecutors/
[https://perma.cc/33FH-ECYH].
65. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 448 (2014). The court stated that if the
government does not establish this element, it “cannot meet its burden of showing that
the tippee knew of a breach.” Id.
66. The Court explicitly declined to examine this issue. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 425
n.1.
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the tippee “knows or should know that there has been a breach.” 67
However, the Court in Salman cited Dirks for the proposition that the
tippee acquires the duty of trust and confidence if the tippee “knows the
information was disclosed in breach of the tipper’s duty”;68 notably absent
is the phrase “should know.” It is ambiguous whether the Court
purposefully modified the requirement in Dirks, or whether the Court’s
omission was unintended, and thus only misquoted Dirks.
As a result of this uncertainty, prosecuting remote tippees is made
potentially more difficult. These remote tippees may not know the initial
source of the nonpublic information, and therefore would not know if the
tipper derived any benefit from the initial disclosure. This could
complicate prosecution as it affords remote tippees the affirmative
defense of plausible deniability.69 Moreover, if the new standard of tippee
knowledge omits “should know,” then even constructive knowledge of a
breach may not be enough to convict.
2. Classification and Criteria of Relationships Permitting an Inference
of a Personal Benefit
Salman did not provide guidance as to the criteria that courts should
use in analyzing relationships to infer a personal benefit. In Salman, the
Court noted that Maher and Michael were brothers, the “very close
relationship” they shared, and their repeated trading transactions. 70
Therefore, the Court found the nature of their relationship permitted an
inference of a personal benefit.71
67. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (emphasis added).
68. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 423.
69. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, US Supreme Court’s ‘Salman v. US’ Decision
Answers One Insider-Trading Question, Leaves Others Unresolved, WFL LEGAL PULSE
(Dec. 8, 2016), https://wlflegalpulse.com/2016/12/08/us-supreme-courts-salman-v-us-
decision-answers-one-insider-trading-question-leaves-others-unresolved
[https://perma.cc/C9BQ-L3YD].
70. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 424. It is uncertain why the Court emphasized the closeness
of their relationship. A generous reading could see this as an implicit endorsement of
Newman’s requirement for how close two parties must be to infer a benefit while still
rejecting the need for pecuniary gain between friends and family. However, a narrower
reading could find that this is only mentioned in passing, and thus irrelevant because their
relationship falls within the two relationships in Dirks.
71. Id. at 427–29.
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Since Salman did not address how courts should analyze
relationships, two issues remain. First, whether a tipper’s disclosure of
information to a person other than a trading relative or friend who
subsequently trades is actionable under Dirks and Salman.72 Newman
explicitly ruled out casual social relationships between tippers and tippees
as sufficient to infer the existence of a friendship, and instead embraced a
more stringent standard.73 When examining this standard of friendship, it
is worth noting the sorts of activities that Newman explicitly found
insufficient to infer a friendship: common favors that tippees provide to a
large group (of friends or alumni), occasionally meeting at large social
events, or historically being “family friends.”74 Thus, Newman draws a
distinct line: absent a meaningful relationship or an objective personal
benefit (e.g., cash), there can be no inference of a personal benefit to the
tipper, and thus no Rule 10b-5 liability. Salman, however, only restated
the two relationships in Dirks and does not offer any guidance regarding
how to analyze tips provided to those outside the tipper’s family or
friends.75 The analysis for traders who are considered neither friends nor
family is therefore left for the lower courts to decide.
This raises the second question of what factors courts should
consider when determining whether two parties are friends or trading
relatives for the purposes of inferring a personal benefit to the tipper.76 In
holding that Salman assumed the fiduciary duty, the Court emphasized
how close Salman was with Maher and Michael, but did not specify
whether Salman assumed the duty as a “friend” or as a “trading
relative.”77 The Court mentioned in passing that Maher married Salman’s
72. See infra Part II.B.
73. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2014).
74. Id. at 452–53, 455. Despite classifying the tipper and tippee as “family friends,”
the court does not specify how long the families knew each other, nor what interactions
the tipper and the tippee previously had in the family context. Id. at 452.
75. Compare Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427–29 (“Our [previous] discussion of gift giving
resolves this case.”), with Newman, 773 F.3d at 452 (“[T]he mere fact of a friendship,
particularly of a casual or social nature” was insufficient to show a personal benefit to
the tipper, observing that “[i]f this was a ‘benefit,’ practically anything would qualify.”).
76. See Jen Wieczner, Here’s What the Supreme Court Insider Trading Ruling
Means for Hedge Funds, FORTUNE (Dec. 6, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/12/06/
supreme-court-insider-trading-salman-hedge-fund/ [https://perma.cc/N7VM-8JT8].
77. See Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427 (emphasis in original) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646, 664 (1983)).
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sister.78 Although Salman knew ofMaher’s initial breach and acquired the
fiduciary duty through Michael, the question remains whether Salman
was considered a “relative” of the brothers by marriage.79
If Salman acquired Maher’s fiduciary duty as a friend, this would
provide some clarity to lower courts about the types of interactions and
length of relationship tippers and tippees could have to infer that there
was a personal benefit to the tipper. However, if Salman acquired this
duty as a family member, the meaning of “trading relative” would apply
to members outside the immediate family, raising more questions as to
which familial relationships would lend an inference of a personal benefit
under the classical theory. This also raises the question as to what types
of social interactions a tipper would need to have with a family member
to infer a benefit.80
Finally, it is still unclear how courts should determine whether
tippers and tippees are “friends.” Courts are free to choose what factors
to consider and howmuch weight to give them—i.e. how long tippers and
tippees have known each other, how often they interacted, and the context
in which they interacted, among many other case-specific considerations.
B. THE LIMITS OF SALMAN
A few hypotheticals best demonstrate the issues that are left
unanswered. Take, for example, a scenario where a Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) regularly works out with a personal trainer. During their
workout sessions, the CEO reveals that he is stressed about his company’s
merger. The personal trainer then uses this nonpublic information to trade.
78. Id. at 421.
79. Implicit in the Court’s decision is that Salman could have only been a friend or
relative to acquire Michaels’s derived fiduciary duty. There is no mention of any
pecuniary or reputational gain that Michael received in exchange for the tips he gave to
Salman. Therefore, for Michael to have breached his acquired duty, he must have
received a personal benefit from tipping Salman. The facts state that Michael “became
friends with Salman.” Id. at 425. However, the Court did not state whether Michael began
tipping Salman before or after Maher’s marriage to Salman’s sister. The Court
paradoxically refers to Salman as Maher’s brother-in-law, but as Michael’s friend. Id. at
424.
80. Part II.B, infra, discusses the role of being a family member in a personal benefit
analysis.
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Assume further that the personal trainer is not considered the CEO’s
friend or relative.81
Since the personal trainer is not a trading relative or friend, the
government would need to prove that the CEO received a direct or
indirect personal benefit that will “translate into future earnings” under
Dirks.82 While the benefit of physical health is important, the “personal
benefit” requirement is essentially a placeholder for self-dealing, and the
disclosure to the personal trainer does not seem to provide any financial
or reputational benefit to the CEO nor detract from any corporate
earnings. 83 Without applying Newman’s “meaningful[] relationship”
standard or a requirement that the personal trainer should know that this
information is confidential, this disclosure would likely not result in either
the CEO or the personal trainer being found liable under the classical
theory.84
To understand how problems arise regarding tippees who are
multiple levels removed from the initial tipper, consider the following
example. An insider at a corporation discloses a potential merger to his
former college roommate. The former roommate then tells his girlfriend,
who then tells her friend, and that friend subsequently trades. Assume
further that this trader does not know the initial insider who first shared
the tip or the former college roommate. While in the Salman case, Salman
knew the benefits Maher and Michael received from their relationship,
the Court did not need to comment further on the requirement that the
81. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Andrew Verstein on the Salman Personal
Benefit Standard for Tipping Liability, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 2, 2017),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2017/01/andrew-
verstein-on-the-salman-personal-benefit-standard-for-tipping-liability.html
[https://perma.cc/2KX8-UQVQ].
82. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663.
83. See id. at 663–64. The idea of “self dealing” is that the party who possesses inside
information receives either a pecuniary or reputational gain that may result in profits. See
id. at 663. Therefore, physical health would not likely fall within this framework.
84. In Salman, the government argued for a broader definition of personal benefit to
include “noncorporate purpose[s],” which under a broad reading, could possibly have
included the alleged benefit here. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 426. However, under the current
framework, these questions may even hinge on how many times they have discussed
work. See SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 941, 949 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (disclosing a
merger to a longtime barber did not violate Rule 10b-5 because there was no discernable
benefit to the tipper).
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tippees must know of the insider’s benefit derived from disclosure.85
However, in this example, the trader does not know of any personal
benefit that the initial tipper receives. Without proof that the remote
tippees knew of the initial breach, the government would have a difficult
time proving a remote tippee’s knowledge of the breach under Salman.86
The ambiguity regarding whether or not a tippee “should know” of
the tipper’s breach further complicates the issue. For example, consider
three friends in a social setting: a known corporate insider, a woman, and
the woman’s boyfriend. Neither the woman nor her boyfriend are active
traders, and although they each know where the other individuals work,
they never discuss their work. However, the insider and the boyfriend go
to a restaurant for lunch where the insider discloses a future merger,
receives a call, and suddenly leaves. The boyfriend then tells his girlfriend
about the merger, and she later trades on this information. While it is clear
that she should know of a breach (after all, it was the same company where
the insider works), under Salman it is unclear whether constructive
knowledge is sufficient to impose liability.87
Finally, the Court did not define the contours of the family and
friends to whom a gift constitutes a personal benefit. For example, take
the case of estranged siblings who do not maintain any sort of active
relationship or contact. However, by accident the insider-sibling
accidentally e-mails his estranged sibling a tip regarding a potential
merger from his work account. The tippee-sibling subsequently trades.
Since there was no intended gift of proceeds to the tipper in the disclosure,
the question depends on whether the existence of a biological relationship
is sufficient to establish an inference of an improper benefit. 88 In
analyzing liability, courts tend to emphasize the closeness of the tippers
and tippees’ relationship, even in familial relationships, to infer a personal
85. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427–28.
86. See Avi Weitzman et al., Right Back Where We Started From? In Salman, the
Supreme Court Clarifies the “Personal Benefit” Test but Otherwise Leaves Undisturbed
Insider Trading Contours, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (Dec. 7, 2016),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/right-back-where-we-started-from-in-salman-the-
supreme-court-clarifies-the-personal-benefit-test-but-otherwise-leaves-undisturbed-
insider-trading-contours/ [https://perma.cc/G8LA-TXSU].
87. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 425 n.1.
88. Indeed, this question could extend to encompass estranged cousins, or even the
status of in-laws as in Salman.
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benefit. However, the weight that courts should give to a mere familial tie
in a personal benefit analysis is uncertain.
A similar scenario to the case above illustrates the difficulty in
defining what constitutes a “friend.” Imagine a corporate insider comes
home late from a bar and accidentally posts a public status to his Facebook
page revealing insider information. Someone who the man is friends with
on Facebook, but has never actually met and never spoken with in person,
reads this information and trades. There is no personal benefit to the tipper
by his accidental disclosure89—which then raises the question as to what
objective criteria courts should consider when classifying this sort of
relationships and determining whether someone is a “friend.”90 While the
standard in Newman would most likely indicate that the tipper received a
benefit, other circuits are free to interpret “friend” in a more loose or
casual sense.
In sum, Salman’s narrow holding and ambiguous language leaves
many important questions unanswered.
III. THENEEDFORMORECOMPLETEDEFINITIONS
OF “KNOWLEDGE”AND “PERSONALBENEFIT”
Courts have found the personal benefit requirement fulfilled even
without any pecuniary or reputational gain. 91 However, the Supreme
Court and the SEC have yet to provide guiding principles for courts to
follow when imposing liability under the personal benefit test. Indeed, the
SEC already provided guidance by promulgating a non-exhaustive list of
criteria in Rule 10b5-2 when there is a “duty of trust and confidence” in
misappropriation cases.92 Therefore, it is preferable to introduce objective
criteria for courts to use with the personal benefit test.
In other securities cases, the Supreme Court has introduced multi-
factor tests to determine whether a venture is an “investment contract”
under the Securities Act of 1933, or whether an instrument is a “security”
89. Suppose that the Facebook friend did not offer cash, favors, or could enhance the
tipper’s relationship in any social circles.
90. See Bainbridge, supra note 69.
91. See, e.g., SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2003) (maintaining a
strong professional relationship is enough to infer a benefit).
92. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2017). The Court in Dirks and Salman appear to be
closing the similar loop for the classical theory by determining when there are personal
benefits.
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under the Exchange Act. 93 Accordingly, this Note proposes several
factors for courts to consider in determining whether relationships satisfy
the personal benefit requirement under the classical theory of tipper and
tippee liability94:
(a) immediate family members as defined in Rule 10b-2(b)(3)95 and
with whom the tipper maintains consistent contact, subject to the
defenses therein;
(b) roommates, or people with whom the tipper has a living
arrangement that is planned to last for at least a year;
(c) friends with whom the tipper has had a relationship of consistent,
personal, and meaningful contact;96
(d) parties in settings who know or should know that material,
nonpublic information is being discussed;
(e) parties where the tipper has disclosed the nonpublic information
with the primary intent to expose a corporate fraud and the tippee
trades contrary to this intent, with no subsequent liability to the
tipper.
Each of these criteria will be discussed in turn.
A. IMMEDIATE FAMILYMEMBERS
The need for a criteria addressing what constitutes a family member
is clear. Case law has not defined what constitutes a relative, and courts
have wide latitude in interpreting case law, statutes, and previous rulings.
This proposed understanding gives outward boundaries to the definition
of “relative” by relating it to the previously defined relationships in Rule
93. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 496
U.S. 56 (1990).
94. Cf. Sara Almousa, Friends with Benefits? Clarifying the Role Relationships Play
in Satisfying the Personal Benefit Requirement Under Tipper-Tippee Liability, 23 GEO.
MASONL.REV. 1251, 1274–77 (2016).While the author proposes some criteria to resolve
the issues at hand, it does not establish enough objective criteria to resolve the
hypotheticals in Part II.B, and still gives too much leeway to courts in interpreting the
proposed regulations.
95. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(3). These relationships include: “Whenever a person
receives or obtains material, nonpublic information from his or her spouse, parent, child,
or sibling.” Id. (emphasis added).
96. See Almousa, supra note 94, at 1274.
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10b5-2, while also providing a rebuttable presumption that the tipper
received any personal benefit from the disclosure.97
Furthermore, this understanding of “relative” would not cover
disclosures between estranged siblings, as the tippee may rebut this
presumption under the exemption in Rule 10b5-2(b)(3) by not having a
history of sharing confidences. This presumption is also consistent with
the language in Dirks because the accidental disclosure to the tippee
would not be the equivalent of trading and then giving a gift of cash
proceeds, which is what the Court contemplated when it held that gifts to
relatives also result in a personal benefit to the tipper.98
B. ROOMMATES
The relationship between roommates is more difficult to define. For
instance, renters may sublease their apartments for a matter of mere
weeks, which would not produce the level of perceived closeness as
articulated in Dirks or Newman. This proposed interpretation creates a
rule that instructs courts to consider objective criteria, for example, the
length of lease agreements. It also comports with the logic in Dirks of
giving a gift of cash proceeds; roommates may be occasionally short on
cash for their obligations as tenants, and a tipper’s gift of nonpublic
information could result in a benefit that translates into cash to cover her
obligations. Furthermore, the criterion is present- and forward-looking in
that past living arrangements of a year or longer do not allow the inference
of a personal benefit. If a tipper tips a former roommate (as in the
hypothetical above) or someone with whom she has lived less than a year,
a court may still impose liability as a “friend” under Dirks.99
C. PEOPLE WITHWHOM THE TIPPER HASMEANINGFUL CONTACT
This interpretation codifies the standard in Newman. This criterion
proposes an objective analysis of how the tipper and tippee interact—
which precludes courts from giving too much consideration to casual
social interactions or favors the tippee provides to a larger, non-trading
97. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b5-2(b)(3) (2017). The statute provides for an exemption if a
tippee can prove that she did not know the tipper was the source of the information, that
there was no pattern or history of sharing confidences, and there was no explicit
agreement to keep the information confidential. Id.
98. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
99. See generally Almousa, supra note 94, at 1274–75.
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audience. This still affords courts discretion to decide what constitutes
“regular” contact, as parties may become close quickly, thus leading the
tipper to share nonpublic information for the purpose of improving the
budding relationship.
Furthermore, this criterion precludes liability from unintentional
disclosures to random parties, such as disclosures through a Facebook
status to a large, but anonymous audience. This approach is consistent
with the logic in Dirks, which presumably did not intend for tippers to be
liable if they accidentally disclose nonpublic information to an
anonymous audience. Any relationships not encompassed by this
criterion would be rare, as it is difficult to imagine a case where a tipper
would intend a gift of cash proceeds for a stranger.
D. PARTIESWHOKNOW OR SHOULDKNOWMATERIAL, NONPUBLIC
INFORMATION ISBEINGDISCUSSED
This interpretation provides a “catch-all” provision for Rule 10b-5
liability, as it adds context to judge whether a tippee “should know” there
was a breach. Moreover, it codifies the situations where an individual
acquires nonpublic information through a confidential relationship or
through temporary relationships with a corporation, thus prohibiting them
from trading.100 This interpretation risks creating ambiguity, however,
and a few hypotheticals illustrate the outer limits that this Note
contemplates.
Imagine a corporation hires a catering service to cater its corporate
picnic. Picnic attendees would not expect the caterers to eavesdrop as they
discuss corporate business at the event, and therefore would not change
the content of their conversation when a caterer member is present. Under
the current classical theory, an eavesdropping caterer who hears
nonpublic information and subsequently trades would not be liable under
Rule 10b-5; the source did not receive any pecuniary or reputational
benefit from “disclosing” under Dirks, the tippers are not friends with the
tippees, and the caterer did not enter into a relationship with the
corporation for a “special confidential relationship in the conduct of the
business,” such as lawyers or accountants.101
The proposed interpretation, however, imposes these “temporary
insiders” with the same fiduciary duties as the insiders by adding the
100. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14.
101. Id.
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context in which they acquire the nonpublic information to the court’s
analysis. Under these facts, any caterers at least “should know” that
company information may be discussed since it is a corporate event. This
interpretation would also result in a stronger case against the girlfriend
whose boyfriend tips her of their friend’s company’s merger.102 There, the
parties never discussed these matters, but a sudden revelation of the
merger would arguably give her at least constructive knowledge that the
information was nonpublic and therefore that she should not trade on it.
Context, however, may be ambiguous as to how an unintended tippee
acquires information. Imagine a student is walking down the street and he
overhears two men discussing an upcoming merger. He does not
recognize either of the men. The men then enter a building that the student
knows belongs exclusively to a certain corporation. The student uses the
information he overheard to trade. Under this criterion, the student’s
liability would turn on whether or not the student “should know” that the
information is nonpublic. Although “should know” seems to leave wide
discretion to the courts, the analysis here turns on objective factors:
whether the student saw them swipe their employee cards to enter the
building (which grants exclusive access only to employees); whether the
student overheard them say that they were employees of the company;103
whether they were wearing any company paraphernalia, etc.
Aside from the context, there are questions as to whether a tippee’s
subjective knowledge of corporate insiders could result in liability. For
example, take a law student ignorant of the who’s who of the corporate
world and a partner in a law firm who regularly interacts with high-level
corporate employees. Both walk into a pub and see a man and a woman
talking at the bar, both of whom are CEOs. The law student, unaware who
the man and the woman are, approaches the bar, eavesdrops on their
conversation, learns about an upcoming tender offer, and uses the
information to trade for a large profit. The partner also enters and
recognizes the two sitting at the bar. The partner approaches the CEOs
and eavesdrops, learns about the tender offer, and subsequently trades for
an even larger profit.
102. See supra Part II.B.
103. If neither of the men worked for the company but were instead visiting for a
meeting regarding the merger, then the student could argue that he had no knowledge of
the initial breach, and thus would not be liable. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d
438, 448–49 (2d Cir. 2014).
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Under the current state of insider trading liability, the law student
would not be liable. He does not know the identity of the CEOs, and could
reasonably assume that high-level employees would not be discussing
such private information in public. Absent any other contextual clues,
there is no reason the law student should know the information being
discussed was private, and thus would not be liable. Conversely, the
partner would be liable; she knows that the two individuals were CEOs,
purposefully sought them out at the bar, and eavesdropped. She at least
“should know” that they were discussing nonpublic information when she
learned of the tender offer.
One critique of these contrary outcomes is whether there should be a
heightened duty on those who should know nonpublic information is
being discussed. 104 However, it seems appropriate to hold those who
know, or have reasons to know, that nonpublic information is being
discussed to a higher standard of liability. Courts are still able to look to
objective factors in assigning liability.105 Here, for example, a court may
examine whether the partner previously worked with the CEOs on any
transactions, interacted socially, or investigated whether the tender offer
was public on her electronic devices.106
E. PARTIESWHERE THE TIPPERHAS EXPLICITLYDISCLOSED THE
NONPUBLIC INFORMATION FOR ANON-PERSONALBENEFIT
Oddly enough, the holding in Dirks results in an anomaly: an insider
may disclose nonpublic information for a non-personal benefit and the
tippee may use this information for personal purposes without incurring
Rule 10b-5 liability. To illustrate this point, take the facts of Dirks: an
insider discloses an uninvestigated but actual corporate fraud to an
investigator. Further assume that the corporation committing fraud is
104. For example, the partner here could investigate whether the tender offer was
public before trading to avoid liability.
105. For example, tort law already imposes a heightened obligation based on a party’s
subjective knowledge and skill. See, e.g., Sunset Beach Invs., LLC v. Kimley-Horn &
Assocs., 207 So. 3d 1012, 1014 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (professional license creates a
special duty).
106. If the partner had investigated whether the tender offer was public, learned that
the tender offer was not public, and yet still chose to trade, then it would seem appropriate
to hold that she should have known that the conversation between CEOs was a breach.
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about to merge with a target corporation. 107 However, instead of
investigating and exposing the corporate fraud, the investigator decides
to buy shares in the target corporation and sells them for a profit when the
merger is announced.
UnderDirks and Salman, there would be no Rule 10b-5 liability. The
insider did not receive a personal benefit by receiving a pecuniary or
reputational gain or by disclosing to a friend or relative; rather, the insider
disclosed the nonpublic information to a stranger. Without this initial
breach, there could be no derivative breach by the investigator, regardless
of what he does with the information, as there must be an initial breach
for there to be subsequent liability.108
The criterion proposed in this Note addresses this anomaly. While
the Court in Dirks sought to avoid “reading the parties’ minds,” a court
may still look to the context behind the tipper’s disclosure to determine if
he intended to disclose a fraud. A court may consider factors such as
whether the insider knew the investigator prior to the disclosure (and thus
had a history of any quid pro quo exchanges), whether the investigator
promises to publish an article praising the insider and resulting in a
reputational benefit, or whether the investigator promises to recommend
any future clients to the tipper. If the court found that the insider was
sufficiently altruistic in his disclosure to an investigator, he would be free
of any liability. Thus, only the investigator could be liable for
purposefully profiting from the disclosure.
A criticism of this interpretation is that it does not adequately address
“mixed disclosures,” or the idea that a disclosure is intentionally made to
expose a fraud, yet results in a personal benefit. Dirks is problematic in
this regard as it does not state whether the insider must intend to receive
a gain by disclosing.109 For example, an insider chooses to disclose fraud,
but later receives a reputational benefit from his honorable disclosure.
However, in examining the context in which the tipper discloses the
107. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 647–48, 666–67 (1983).
108. Id. at 662. Interestingly, this would not result in any liability under the criteria
for the misappropriation theory because the disclosure was not made in confidence, there
were no patterns of sharing confidences, and the parties were not related. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b5-2 (2017).
109. “This requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider
receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain
or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.” Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663
(emphasis in original).
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information, this criterion addresses this concern by looking to the
tipper’s primary intent at the time of disclosure. Moreover, as a matter of
public policy, courts should not impose liability when the benefits of the
disclosure to the public at large outweigh the harm or personal benefits to
the tipper.110
CONCLUSION
As shown, the role of relationships in tipper-tippee liability is in flux.
Current insider trading jurisprudence opts to leave these questions to
courts, which “may not always be easy.” 111 Such wide discretion in
answering these questions can lead to inconsistent outcomes and does not
put defendants sufficiently on notice of their liability. This Note
anticipatorily addresses these issues and proposes guidelines with the
objectives of providing more clarity for courts and giving defendants
sufficient notice of instances when they may be liable under the criminal
provisions of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. By considering the
proposed criteria, courts may begin the difficult task of unpacking the
currently unclear cases of liability for insider trading.
110. See id. at 676–77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
111. United States v. Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420, 429 (2016) (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at
664).
